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Abstract
This note gives a counterexample on Ries [Ries, R., 2007, The analytics
of monetary non-neutrality in the Sidrauski model, Economics Letters 94
(1), 129–135]. Using a certain family of utility functions, this note not only
gives a sharper representation than that of Ries but also demonstrates that
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implies that superneutrality does not exist when uncertainty is introduced.
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1 Introduction
Ries (2007) characterized the dynamics of the money-in-the-utility model (Sidrauski,
1967) by using the money demand function to explain the mechanism in a very
intuitive manner. One of his main conclusions is that when assuming that the gov-
ernment can control nominal interest rates by setting any growth rate of money
supply, monetary policy does not affect any level of consumption and capital stock
as long as either money demand is inelastic with respect to nominal interest or
money and consumption are separable in the utility function. Subsequently, Lioui
and Poncet (2008) attached uncertainty with Ries’ framework to demonstrate that
superneutrality is valid only in the case of an interest rate inelastic money demand.
However, both studies do not pursue a sufficient investigation on the relationship
between the money demand function and the utility function.
This note gives a counterexample for their propositions. That is, we show that
within a certain family of utility functions, interest rate inelastic money demand
does not lead to superneutrality. An intuitive explanation is as follows. A nominal
interest monetary policy affects real variables through the product of the inter-
est rate elasticity of money demand and the elasticity of the marginal utility of
consumption with respect to money. When consumption and money are perfectly
complementary, the former elasticity is zero but the latter elasticity takes infinity.
When the product of both elasticities converges to a finite value, such a policy is
still effective.
2
2 Ries–Sidrauski Economy
In order to prepare a counterexample, this section briefly reviews a Ries–Sidrauski
economy and reconsiders the assumptions on the utility function of Ries (2007).
In the economy, ct > 0, kt > 0, and mt > 0, respectively, denote consumption,
capital stock, and real balances or just money. Technology is characterized by a
constant parameter δ> 0 of depreciation rate and a production function f (kt)< 0
with fk > 0, fkk < 0, f (0) = 0, limk→0 fk =∞, and limk→∞ fk = 0. Representative
agents are infinity lived with perfect foresight, and their preferences are charac-
terized by a constant parameter ρ > 0 of the rate of time preference and a utility
function u(ct ,mt). A set of assumptions imposed on u is discussed later.
In equilibrium, the representative agent maximizes their lifetime utility to
choose ct and mt , the markets are clear, and the government chooses nominal
interest rates Rt = fk(kt)+pit , where pit denotes inflation rates, by controlling an
appropriate rate of money growth.
The equilibrium dynamics system is characterized by the money demand func-
tion ϕ(c,R), defined by R = um(c,ϕ)/uc(c,ϕ), which results from the necessary
condition for the maximization problem of the representative agents. Using ϕ, we
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describe the dynamics system1 as
θ
c˙
c
= fk−δ−ρ−ξη R˙R
k˙ = f −δk− c.
where θ=−cucc(c,ϕ(c,R))/uc(c,ϕ(c,R))−ξζ, ξ=mucm(c,ϕ(c,R))/uc(c,ϕ(c,R)),
η=−RϕR(c,R)/ϕ(c,R), and ζ= cϕc(c,R)/ϕ(c,R), respectively, represent the in-
verse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the elasticity of the marginal
utility of consumption with respect to real money balances, the interest rate elas-
ticity of money demand, and the consumption elasticity of money demand.
Ries (2007), in his proposition 2, stated that money is superneutral when ξη
is equal to zero. Following the proposition, Ries stated that such superneutrality
attains either if money and consumption are separable in the utility function (ξ=
0) or if money demand is inelastic with respect to nominal interest (η= 0). In this
note, we give a counterexample satisfying η= 0 but ξη 6= 0.
Before providing the example, we discuss a set of assumptions regarding the
utility function. Ries (2007) assumed uc > 0, ucc < 0, um ≥ 0, umm ≤ 0, uccunn ≥
ucm, and ucm≥ 0. When we assume um = 0, then um/uc = R= 0, implying that the
government should set zero nominal interest rates. In addition, when we assume
uccumm = u2cm, then, as shown later, we cannot exclude the possibility of θ = 0.
1In the conventional monetary policy with a constant rate of money growth µ, we should add
η
R˙
R
+ζ
c˙
c
= fk +µ−R
to the two equations in order to describe the system.
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The assumption ucm ≥ 0 is a little bit restrictive because this assumption excludes
the case of θ > 1 in the famous CRRA form of u(c,m) = (c1−αmα)1−θ/(1−θ),
where 0 < α< 1 is a constant parameter.
Instead of the above assumptions on the utility function, we propose the fol-
lowing assumption: uc > 0, ucc < 0, um > 0, umm < 0, uccunn−u2cm > 0, ucmum−
ummuc > 0, and ucucm−uccum > 0 for all c > 0 and m > 0. The first four assump-
tions indicate that u is strictly increasing and strictly concave with respect to c and
m. The last two assumptions arise from ∂(um/uc)/∂c > 0 and ∂(um/uc)/∂m > 0.
These assumptions are the same as those of Fischer (1979). Using the total differ-
ential form dR = {∂(um/uc)/∂c}dc+{∂(um/uc)/∂m}dm, we obtain
ϕR =
u2c
ummuc−ucmum
∣∣∣∣
m=ϕ(c,R)
(1)
ϕc =
uccum−ucucm
ummuc−ucmum
∣∣∣∣
m=ϕ(c,R)
and
θ= −c uccumm−u
2
cm
ummuc−ucmum
∣∣∣∣
m=ϕ(c,R)
.
Therefore, if the above assumptions are satisfied, then −ϕR, ϕc, and θ are all
nonnegative. When ucmum− ummuc and ucucm− uccum are finite, then −ϕR, ϕc,
and θ are all positive.
From equation (1), the interest rate elasticity of money demand η=−RϕR/ϕ
might takes zero only when ucmum − ummuc takes infinity, This would happen
when ucm or ζ = mucm/uc takes infinity. This makes us conjecture that, even
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when η= 0, the product of η and ζ is not necessarily zero.
3 Counterexample
Because we cannot prove the conjecture in the above general class of utility
functions, we set a somewhat restrictive class to give a counterexample. Let
u(c,m) = w(cψ(z)), where z = m/c > 0. When −cψw′′/w′ is constant, this is
exactly the class of utility functions Lucas (2000) proposed. In order for u to be
strictly increasing and strictly concave with respect to c and m, respectively, we
assume that w and ψ are strictly increasing and strictly concave, respectively, and
0 < zψ′/ψ< 1 for all z > 0.
Under this class, the money demand function is determined by
R =
ψ(z)
ψ(z)− zψ′(z) . (2)
The right-hand side of the above equation is positive and strictly decreasing for
all z > 0,2 and, accordingly, there exists an inverse function z = φ(R). Thus, the
money demand function m = cφ(R) is well-defined. The elasticities of the money
demand function with respect to consumption and interest rates are, respectively,
unity and
η=−Rφ
′(R)
φ(R)
= −ψ
′(z){ψ(z)− zψ′(z)}
zψ(z)ψ′′(z)
∣∣∣∣
z=φ(R)
.
2In fact
d
dz
ψ(z)
ψ(z)− zψ′(z) =
ψ′′(z)ψ(z)
{ψ(z)− zψ′(z)}2 < 0.
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The last equality is established by using equation (1) and u(c,m) = w(cψ(z)).
The dynamic is described as the same in the previous section and the coeffi-
cients are expressed in a simpler way. With some algebraic operations,3 we can
get θ= cψw′′/w′|z=φ(R) and
ξ= (1/η−θ)zψ
′(z)
ψ(z)
∣∣∣∣
z=φ(R)
. (3)
Equation (3) indicates that the elasticity of the shadow price uc with respect to
money is represented much more clearly than that of Ries (2007). That is, the
elasticity ξ is determined by η, θ, and the relative slope of ψ. When 1/η >
θ or η < 1/θ, then the interest elasticity of money demand is smaller than the
elasticity of the intertemporal substitution. In this case, the shadow price of capital
is increasing in money. When η = 1/θ, then ucm = 0 or the utility function is
separable.
Because ξη = (1−ηθ)zψ′/ψ and 0 < zψ′/ψ < 1, we can show η = 0 but
ξη 6= 0 within our family of utility function. Even if η→ 0, ξ is growing much
faster, and, accordingly, ξη converges to zψ′/ψ. Only when the utility function is
separable does ξη take the value of zero.
Finally, we present a parametric example. The utility function is described as
u(c,m) =
[(1−α)cη−1η +αmη−1η ]η(1−θ)η−1
1−θ =
{cψ(z)}1−θ
1−θ
where 0 < α < 1, θ > 0, and η ≥ 0 are constant parameters and ψ(z) = [1−
3See Appendix.
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α+αz
η−1
η ]
η
η−1 for z = m/c > 0. Notice that z = min[c,m] when η = 0 and that
z = c1−αmα when η = 1. Consumption and real balances are perfect comple-
ments when η = 0. The case of η = 0 corresponds the case of a cash-in-advance
economy, in which money is needed for purchasing consumption goods and the
cash-in-advance constraint is always binding.4
In this case, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the interest rate
elasticity are respectively determined by the constant parameters 1/θ and η, and
ξη is represented as a function only of R, or
ξη=
(
αηR1−η
(1−α)η+αηR1−η
)
(1−θη) .
Clearly, ξη = R/(1+ R) when η = 0 and ξη = α(1− θ) when η = 1. When
θη= 1, ξη takes zero.
4 Concluding Remarks
In summary, using a larger set of utility functions than that of Lucas (2000), we not
only give a sharper representation than that of Ries (2007) but also give a coun-
terexample. When consumption and real balances are perfectly complement, then
the interest rate elasticity of money demand is zero but a nominal interest policy
is not superneutral. Only in the case of a separable utility function does superneu-
trality survive. This discussion assumes that consumers have perfect foresight and
4The constraint m ≤ c is binding when the government sets the nominal interest rate to be
positive.
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no uncertainty exists. When uncertainty is introduced, following Lioui and Poncet
(2008), separability does not assure superneutrality. Therefore, no superneutrality
exists with our family of utility functions.
Appendix
Consider u(c,m) = w(y), where y = ψ(m/c)c. The derivatives of u are described
as follows:
uc = {ψ(m/c)−ψ′(m/c)m/c}w′(y)
um = ψ′(m/c)w′(y)
ucc = {ψ(m/c)−ψ′(m/c)m/c}2w′′(y)+(m2/c3)ψ′′(m/c)w′(y)
umm = {ψ′(m/c)}2w′′(y)+ψ′′(m/c)(1/c)w′(y)
ucm = ψ′(m/c){ψ(m/c)−ψ′(m/c)m/c}w′′(y)− (m/c2)ψ′′(m/c)w′(y).
The money demand function is derived from equation (2). The total differen-
tial form is described as dR = {∂(um/uc)/∂c}dc+{∂(um/uc)/∂m}dm, where
∂(um/uc)
∂c
=
ucucm−umucc
u2c
=− (m/c
2)ψ(m/c)ψ′′(m/c)
{ψ(m/c)− (m/c)ψ′(m/c)}2
∂(um/uc)
∂m
=
ucumm−umucm
u2c
=
(1/c)ψ(m/c)ψ′′(m/c)
{ψ(m/c)− (m/c)ψ′(m/c)}2 .
Using ϕR = 1/{∂(um/uc)/∂m} and ϕc = −{∂(um/uc)/∂c}/{∂(um/uc)/∂m} =
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m/c, we obtain:
η = =−R/{m∂(um/uc)/∂m}
= −ψ
′(m/c){ψ(m/c)− (m/c)ψ′(m/c)}
(m/c)ψ(m/c)ψ′′(m/c)
ζ = −{c∂(um/uc)/∂c}/{m∂(um/uc)/∂m}= 1.
Because of ζ= 1,
θ = −cucc
uc
− mucm
uc
=−cψ(m/c)w
′′(y)
w′(y)
.
Because of
mucm
uc
= −θm/cψ
′(m/c)
ψ(m/c)
− (m
2/c2)ψ′′(m/c)
ψ(m/c)−ψ′(m/c)m/c ,
we obtain equation (3).
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Technical appendix to A remark on Ries
(2007)
Kenji Miyazaki∗
December 8, 2010
When considering a general utility function u(c,m), the money demand func-
tion ϕ(c,R), defined by R= um(c,ϕ)/uc(c,ϕ). The dynamics of the Ries economy
are described as
ξη
R˙
R
+θ
c˙
c
= fk−δ−ρ
k˙ = f −δk− c,
where θ=−cucc/uc−ξζ, ξ= mucm/uc, η=−RϕR/ϕ, and ζ= cϕc/ϕ.
As for u, we assume: uc > 0, ucc < 0, um > 0, umm < 0, uccunn− u2cm > 0,
ucmum−ummuc > 0, and ucucm−uccum > 0 for all c> 0 and m> 0. The last two
assumptions arise from ∂(um/uc)/∂c > 0 and ∂(um/uc)/∂m > 0. Using the total
differential form, dR= {∂(um/uc)/∂c}dc+{∂(um/uc)/∂m}dm, we obtain
ϕR =
u2c
ummuc−ucmum (1)
ϕc =
uccum−ucucm
ummuc−ucmum (2)
and
θ = −cucc/uc−ucmcϕc/uc
= −cucc/uc− cucm(uccum−ucucm)uc(ummuc−ucmum)
∗Faculty of Economics, Hosei University, 4342 Aihara, Machida, Tokyo, Japan, 194-0298;
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1
= − c
uc
ucc(ummuc−ucmum)+ucm(uccum−ucucm)
ummuc−ucmum
= −c uccumm−u
2
cm
ummuc−ucmum .
Consider a more restrictive family of utility functions such that u(c,m)=w(y),
where y = ψ(m/c)c. We assume: w′ > 0, w′′ < 0, ψ > 0, ψ′ > 0, ψ′′ < 0, and
ψ(m/c)−ψ′(m/c)m/c> 0. The derivatives of u are described as follows:
uc = {ψ(m/c)−ψ′(m/c)m/c}w′(y)
um = ψ′(m/c)w′(y)
ucc = {ψ(m/c)−ψ′(m/c)m/c}2w′′(y)
+(m2/c3)ψ′′(m/c)w′(y)
umm = {ψ′(m/c)}2w′′(y)
+ψ′′(m/c)(1/c)w′(y)
ucm = ψ′(m/c){ψ(m/c)−ψ′(m/c)m/c}w′′(y)
−(m/c2)ψ′′(m/c)w′(y).
Thus,
cucc
uc
=
{cψ(m/c)−mψ′(m/c)}w′′(y)
w′(y)
+
(m2/c2)ψ′′(m/c)
ψ(m/c)−ψ′(m/c)m/c
mucm
uc
=
mψ′(m/c)w′′(y)
w′(y)
− (m
2/c2)ψ′′(y)
ψ(m/c)−ψ′(m/c)m/c
cucc
uc
+
mucm
uc
=
cψ(m/c)w′′(y)
w′(y)
uccumm−u2cm = [{ψ−ψ′m/c}2w′′+(m2/c3)ψ′′w′][{ψ′}2w′′+ψ′′(1/c)w′]
−[ψ′{ψ−ψ′m/c}w′′− (m/c2)ψ′′w′]2
= {ψ−ψ′m/c}2{ψ′}2{w′′}2+(m2/c3)(1/c){ψ′′}2{w′}2
+{ψ2−2ψψ′m/c+(ψ′)2(m/c)2}(1/c)ψ′′w′′w′+(m2/c3)ψ′′{ψ′}2w′′w′
−{ψ−ψ′m/c}2{ψ′}2{w′′}2− (m2/c4){ψ′′}2{w′}2
2
+2ψ′{ψ−ψ′m/c}(m/c2)ψ′′w′′w′
= {ψ2−2ψψ′m/c+2(ψ′)2(m/c)2}(1/c)ψ′′w′′w′
+2ψ′{ψ−ψ′m/c}(m/c2)ψ′′w′′w′
= (ψ2/c)ψ′′w′′w′.
The money demand function is derived from
R=
ψ(z)
ψ(z)− zψ′(z) ,
where z = m/c. The right-hand side of the above equation is strictly decreasing
because of
d
dz
ψ(z)
ψ(z)− zψ′(z) =
ψ′′(z)ψ(z)
{ψ(z)− zψ′(z)}2 < 0.
Accordingly, there exists an inverse function z= φ(R). Thus, the money demand
function m= cφ(R) = ϕ is well-defined.
The total differential form is described as dR= {∂(um/uc)/∂c}dc+{∂(um/uc)/∂m}dm,
where
∂(um/uc)
∂c
=
ucucm−umucc
u2c
=− mψ(m/c)ψ
′′(m/c)
{cψ(m/c)−mψ′(m/c)}2
= − (m/c
2)ψ(m/c)ψ′′(m/c)
{ψ(m/c)− (m/c)ψ′(m/c)}2
∂(um/uc)
∂m
=
ucumm−umucm
u2c
=
cψ(m/c)ψ′′(m/c)
{cψ(m/c)−mψ′(m/c)}2
=
(1/c)ψ(m/c)ψ′′(m/c)
{ψ(m/c)− (m/c)ψ′(m/c)}2 .
Using this relation:
ϕR = dm/dR = 1/{∂(um/uc)/∂m}
ϕc = dm/dc = −{∂(um/uc)/∂c}/{∂(um/uc)/∂m}= m/c
we obtain:
η = −R/{m∂(um/uc)/∂m}
= −R{ψ(m/c)− (m/c)ψ
′(m/c)}2
(m/c)ψ(m/c)ψ′′(m/c)
= −ψ
′(m/c){ψ(m/c)− (m/c)ψ′(m/c)}
(m/c)ψ(m/c)ψ′′(m/c)
ζ = −{c∂(um/uc)/∂c}/{m∂(um/uc)/∂m}= 1.
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Because of ζ= 1,
θ = −cucc
uc
− mucm
uc
= −cψ(m/c)w
′′(y)
w′(y)
.
Because of
mucm
uc
=
mψ′(m/c)w′′(y)
w′(y)
− (m
2/c2)ψ′′(m/c)
ψ(m/c)−ψ′(m/c)m/c
= −θm/cψ
′(m/c)
ψ(m/c)
− (m
2/c2)ψ′′(m/c)
ψ(m/c)−ψ′(m/c)m/c ,
we obtain
η
mucm
uc
= θ
m/cψ′(m/c)
ψ(m/c)
ψ′(m/c){ψ(m/c)− (m/c)ψ′(m/c)}
(m/c)ψ(m/c)ψ′′(m/c)
+
(m/c)ψ′(m/c)
ψ(m/c)
=
(m/c)ψ′(m/c)
ψ(m/c)
(1−θη).
For example, we consider
ψ(z) = [(1−α)+αzη−1η ] η1−η .
Then
ψ′(z) = αz
η−1
η −1[(1−α)+αzη−1η ] ηη−1−1 > 0,
zψ′
ψ
=
αz
η−1
η
(1−α)+αzη−1η
.
The money function is derived from
R =
ψ′
ψ− zψ′
=
αz
η−1
η −1[(1−α)+αzη−1η ] ηη−1−1
[(1−α)+αzη−1η ] ηη−1 −αzη−1η [(1−α)+αzη−1η ] ηη−1−1
4
=
αz
−1
η
1−α+αzη−1η −αzη−1η
=
αz−
1
η
1−α .
Therefore, z = ((1− α)R/α)−η. Substituting z = ((1− α)R/α)−η into zψ′/ψ
leads to:
zψ′
ψ
=
α((1−α)R/α)1−η
(1−α)+α((1−α)R/α)1−η
=
((1−α)/α)−1((1−α)R/α)1−η
1+((1−α)/α)−1((1−α)R/α)1−η
=
((1−α)/α)−ηR1−η
1+((1−α)/α)−ηR1−η
=
R1−η
((1−α)/α)η+R1−η .
Therefore,
η
mucm
uc
=
(
(1−α)−ηR1−η
α−η+(1−α)−ηR1−η
)
(1−θη) .
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